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Wherever political philosophy deals with the concept of utopia, and thus evokes the question bymeans of which cate-
gorical vocabulary the “non-place” of realized emancipation is supposed to be articulated, political thought finds itself
(re)directed to theology as the place fromwhich it—at least according toCarl Schmitt’s reading (Schmitt, 1979, p. 49)—
once originated.
In this sense, many of the critical political philosophies of the twentieth century are characterized by an enor-
mous breadth of reception of Jewish-Christian traditions and their integration into a political theology aiming for
social emancipation. From the reception of Kabbalistic topoi in Frankfurt school critical theory (Martins, 2016), to
Jewish-Messianic traditions in postmodern and poststructuralist philosophy (Derrida, 2006), on to the debates about
the rereading of the Letters of Paul in the works of Giorgio Agamben (Agamben, 2005), Alain Badiou (Badiou, 2009),
and Slavoj Žižek (Žižek, 2001b).
All of these reactualizations of theological heritage rely on the desire to find ways to express political transcen-
dence as utopia under conditions of concrete, immanent political worldliness. Conceptions of a political utopia are
in epistemological terms “transcendent,” because they are—along the lines of the Kantian definition of the term—
beyond positive, empirical knowledge (Kant, 1968a, p. 236). The fact that as political concepts they still have to relate
toworldly, immanent, positive categories, herebymarks the constitutive contradiction inherent in them,whosemedia-
tion therefore defines the theoretical challenge at hand. In this sense, it is not by coincidence that they find themselves
constantly redirected toGerman idealismas the tradition inwhich the competitionof reason and revelation in thinking
social totality reached its most sophisticated form.
On of the more contemporary proposals in this regard is Slavoj Žižek’s Lacano-Hegelian reactualization of the
Christian heritage, which he strongly marks out against what sees as a “Jewish” tradition in political theology. The aim
of this paper will be a fundamental critique of Žižek’s project that relies both on political and philological arguments.
I will argue that Žižek’s specific rereading of the Christian heritage leads to a voluntarist and solipsistic decisionism
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with strongly authoritarian tendencies. Žižek has already been criticized by many along similar fault lines. The charge
of “decisionist irrationalism” specifically has already been levelled against him (and Alain Badiou) by Micha Brumlik
(Brumlik, 2013, pp. 244–245.). A similar critique has been formulated by Oliver Marchart, calling Žižek’s political
theory a “form of quasi-existentialist adventurism and decisionism” (Marchart, 2007, p. 104), while others have
pointed out the inherent solipsism of his account of political subjectivity (Robinson & Tormey, 2005).
While I substantially agreewith the trajectory of the existing criticismofŽižek’s political philosophy, Iwill formulate
my own critique in the context of the political theology of Ernst Bloch, which both serves as a countermodel and away
to illustrate the—in my opinion—fateful philological choices Žižek makes in his reading of the German idealist and
theological tradition. In this sense, my own critique of Žižek’s project does not systematically differ from the existing
ones, but rather supplements themby providing a countermodel derived from an immanent critique of Žižek’s reading
of the theological and philosophical tradition.
The juxtaposition of Žižek with Bloch appears as uniquely useful in this regard because the philological dimension
of their respective political theologies runs along remarkably similar lines, whichmakes it possible to precisely identify
the nodal points atwhich their conceptions partways, thus shedding light not only on the fact that, but alsowhyŽižek’s
political theology devolves into irrationalist decisionismwhile making the case for a countermodel at the same time.
This venture seems all the more relevant, since the relation between Bloch and Žižek has hitherto been either
neglected or misunderstood. Most importantly by Žižek himself. Although he has barely written on Bloch, there is
oneminor text that specifically focuses on him, a 5-page introduction into an anthology onBlochian utopianism. In this
text Žižekmainly elaborates his own ontology along the lines of Blochian categories, specifically referring to
Bloch’s insight that “only an atheist can be a good Christian and only a Christian can be a good atheist.”
One should take this insight quite literally: in order to be a true atheist, one has to go through theChris-
tian experience of the death of God—of God as the transcendent Master who steers and regulates the
universe—and of resurrection in the Holy Spirit—in the collective of those who fight for emancipation.
(Žižek, 2013, pp. xix–xx)
As we will see, Žižek here attempts to parallelize the two approaches exactly at the point, where—upon closer
scrutiny—theymust appearmost irreconcilable. The notion that Blochian and Žižekian “atheism” essentially mean the
same thing, can only be upheld by neglecting amore thorough philological investigation of the roots of their respective
conceptions of negativity. I will show thatwhat Bloch refers to in the passage quoted byŽižek is a dialecticalmediation
of immanence and transcendence (atheism and Christianity), while Žižek’s model comes down to a radical immanen-
tization of divine transcendence. The misunderstanding thus lies in equating these two approaches. What little exists
in terms of research on this matter essentially either follows a similar parallelization than the one Žižek himself hints
at (Thompson, 2019, pp. 295–301; Stolze, 2019, pp. 207–208) or at least finds the two approaches (whether in whole
or in part) rather unproblematically compatible (Boucher, 2020; Hempel, 2019; Thompson, 2012; Thompson, 2009,
pp. 10–11). In any case, the irreconcilably different conceptions of negativity and the diametrically opposed readings
of the Jewish tradition that Bloch and Žižek embrace, respectively, are by and large conceptually ignored.
However, themisunderstanding could not take place if therewere not substantial similarities between the two con-
ceptions. Both Bloch and Žižek are dialectically versed thinkers whose thought is steeped in the tradition of German
idealism. Both are interested in political theology as a means of articulating the transcendent base of a revolutionary
emancipatory politics. And both their German idealism and political theology rest on strikingly similar sources.
Their exegesis of the Jewish-Christian tradition develops from their respective interpretations of the core of
mosaic monotheism, and both see the myth of job and the passion of Christ as climactic in this regard. The radi-
cally different conclusions at which they arrive can in turn be traced back to their diametrically opposed readings of
late Schelling’s theologico-ontological considerations in his “Freiheitsschrift” (“Philosophical Investigations into the
Essence of Human Freedom”) and the “world ages” fragments and their different assessments of the role of Søren
Kierkegaard’s philosophy in this regard.
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Kierkegaard and, even more so, Schelling therefore appear as the crucial embodiment of an intellectual junction
linking the tradition of German idealism either with left Hegelianism and subsequently Marxism, or existentialism,
and its predecessors. Ernst Bloch himself referred to this intellectual junction as the intersection of the “line of salva-
tion” (“Heilslinie”) and the “line of perdition” (“Unheilslinie”) (Bloch, 1985a, pp. 355–359). According to Bloch, depend-
ing on one’s reading of Schelling, and, more specifically, the “Freiheitsschrift” and the “world ages,” one either arrives
via Schelling at the young Hegelians, Feuerbach, and eventually Marx (“line of salvation”), or one proceeds from late
Schelling directly to Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and eventually Heidegger (“line of perdition”).
While Bloch, as we will see, takes the turn toMarx, specifically by taking up Schelling’s and Kierkegaard’s criticism
ofHegelian panlogismwhile discarding Schelling’s prioritization of nonbeing andKierkegaard’s unmediated solipsism,
thusmanaging tomediate transcendenceand immanence inhis political theology, Žižek, byaffirming saidprioritization
as the “void” in the absolute and collapsing the Judeo-Christian tradition into pure immanence, follows a Kierkegaar-
dian conception of political theology leading to solipsist decisionism.
I will develop my argument in six sections, three pertaining to each author. I will begin with a description and sub-
sequent criticism of Žižek’s model in Sections 1–3, that will be further elucidated in Sections 4–6 by its confrontation
with Bloch’s model along the lines of their reading of Schelling, Kierkegaard, and the Bible.
The first section will describe the relevance of Schelling’s late philosophy for Žižek’s ontological premises. The sec-
ond section will show how Žižek approaches the theological canon, specifically Exodus 3,14, the book of Job and the
passion of Christ, through the lens of the aforementioned ontological premises, while the third section will describe
how Žižek politicizes his ontological considerations and his theological exegesis by recourse to Kierkegaard.
In Section 5, I will briefly outline the contours of Bloch’s ontological premises and their relation to the Marxist
tradition, followed by a discussion of Bloch’s reading of Exodus 3,14, the book of Job and the passion of Christ in
Section 6. The last section will deal with Bloch’s reading of Schelling and Kierkegaard and contrast it with Žižek’s
interpretation.
2 THE VOID OF THE ABSOLUTE: ŽIŽEK READS SCHELLING
One of the key thinkers that inform the political theologies of both Bloch and Žižek is Friedrich Schelling. This in
large part due to the special position that Schelling occupies in the tradition of German idealism and that makes
him uniquely interesting for the political theologies of Bloch and Žižek. Schelling’s late philosophy unifies elements
that were to become prevalent in all forms of post-Hegelian thought. By formulating the first concise criticism of the
Hegelian system as panlogism, questioning the totality of abstract reason and contrasting it with the counterprinciple
of human freedom, while still adhering to the requirements of system philosophy, Schelling tried to creativelymediate
the demands of the abstract universality of reason with the “indivisible remainder” (Schelling, 1975, p. 54) that does
not merge in panlogic systems. In this, he can be seen as an early precursor to both Marxist materialism as well as
existentialism and its insistence on “existence” against the all-devouring force of the essentialist “systems” of German
idealism. It is not by coincidence that both Kierkegaard and Engels attended Schelling’s Berlin lectures (Frank, 1993,
p. 9). BothBloch andŽižek share this reading of Schelling as a crucial nodal point in philosophical history (Bloch, 1985a,
pp. 358–359; Žižek, 2006a, p. 4; Žižek, 2007, pp. 8–9).
But, as opposed to Kierkegaard, in Schelling the critique of panlogic systematic philosophy becomes system
itself. Logos still shapes the world, according to Schelling, but only insofar as it is mediated through something that
precedes it:
Thewhole world lies, so to speak, in the nets of the understanding or of reason, but the question is how
exactly it got into those nets since there is obviously something other and something more than mere
reason in the world, indeed there is something which strives beyond these barriers. (Schelling, 1994,
p. 147)
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Therefore, rather than abstractly negating the force of systematic panlogism, Schelling recognizes that logos itself
necessarily refers to something beyond itself.
Primarily in his “Freiheitsschrift,” and in more detail in the “world ages” fragments, Schelling attempts to ontolog-
ically and conceptually reintegrate this other of logos into a philosophy that, despite its criticism of panlogism, still
aspires to systematicity. He attempts to account for human freedom ontologically, connecting it to a split in god itself.
According to Schelling, God is not only spirit, but a part of him is what Schelling calls “nature in god” (Schelling, 1975,
p. 53), a groundless ground of irrational drives. This primordial “Ungrund [Non-Ground]” (Schelling, 1975, pp. 97–101)
of a-logical or prelogical drives, similar to Schopenhauerian “Wille,” marks the “indivisible remainder”: That which
always resists subsumption under the logos, the “rest” that remains after any systematic endeavor in philosophy
(Schelling, 1975, p. 54). What prevents the absolute, or social totality, from coinciding with itself, thus becomes the
key paradigm of philosophical investigation. This theoretical maneuver will be taken up by both Žižek and Bloch albeit
from radically different perspectives.
The Schellingian conception of an “Ungrund” prior to Logos is interpreted byŽižek as articulating a void in the abso-
lute itself which is, at the same time, byway of the subject’s existential reference to the absolute, always already a void
in the subject itself. An idea that Žižek will constantly reiterate in his following works, but that he develops by way of
his Lacanian reading of Schelling. It is of utmost importance in this regard to note that Žižek’s reading of the “Ungrund”
is a profoundly negative one:
far from being a mere nihil privativum, this ‘nothing’ which precedes Ground stands for the ‘absolute
indifference’ qua the abyss of pure Freedom which is not yet the predicate-property of some Subject
but, rather, designates a pure impersonalWilling [Wollen], which wills nothing. (Žižek, 2007, p. 14)
The explicit reference to “nihil privativum,” that is “nothingness” understood as a lack of something, marks the rad-
ical negativity of Žižek’s conception: The nothingness of the absolute is not to be conceived as a lack or a potential but
a radical glaring void.
According to Žižek’s psychoanalytical-Lacanian reading of Schelling, the prime problem of ontology and theory of
knowledge is therefore not the existence of an unattainable absolute and how it relates to the subject but the very
idea of any transcendent entity relating to human subjectivity. At the heart of the absolute and the heart of modern
subjectivity is a bottomless void:
Here one has to accomplish “another turn of the screw” and to transpose the lack of the subject (his
inability to comply fully with the big Other’s ethical injunction) into a lack of this Other itself: as
Schelling emphasizes, the Absolute itself is split into its true Existence and the impenetrable Ground
of its Existence, so that God Himself, in an unheard-of way, seems to resist the full actualization of the
Ideal — this displacement of the split into the Absolute itself, of course, delivers us from guilt. (Žižek,
2007, p. 98)
Thus, the Žižekian “deliverance from guilt” quoted above is based on the idea that the absolute only exists in its
nonexistence. Or, to put it differently: It is not us humanswhich are imperfect, fallible, incomplete vis-a-vis the perfec-
tion of a transcendent ideal, etc. but it is god (the ideal/the absolute . . . ), who is imperfect because as the absolute it
(he) is identical with its (his) own nonexistence:
instead of a hidden terrifying secret, we encounter the same thing behind the veil as in front of it, this
very lack of difference between the two elements confronts us with the “pure” difference that sepa-
rates an element from itself. And is this also not the ultimate definition of the divinity—God, too, has
to wear a mask of himself? Perhaps “God” is the name for this supreme split between the Absolute as
the noumenal Thing and the Absolute as the appearance of itself, for the fact that the two are the same,
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that the difference between the two is purely formal. In this precise sense, “God” names the supreme
contradiction: God—the absolute unrepresentable Beyond—has to appear as such. (Žižek, 2006b,
p. 109)
In Schelling’s terms: The irrational “Ungrund,” the groundless ground of quasi-Schopenhauerian drives is already
part of god himself. While Schelling still manages to incorporate the Ungrund into a system in which eventually logos
triumphs as the primary principle, Žižek pushes this notion even further, resulting in a conception that keeps themere
form of an absolute intact, but voids it so thoroughly of any traces of substantialism as tomake it virtual identical with
nihilism.
3 ŽIŽEK’S EXEGESIS
Basedon theseontological paradigms,Žižekdevelopshis political theology in the contextof anexaminationof the Jew-
ish legacy in political theology. Žižek echoes the standard philosophical account of the meaning of Jewish monothe-
ism for the development of enlightenment metaphysics and its relation to utopian political aspirations (Žižek, 2001a,
p. 129).
Ranging fromtheearly rationalist philosophyofMaimonides, over toMendelsonand the traditionof Jewishenlight-
enment, up until German Neo-Kantianism and its foremost Jewish representative Hermann Cohen, the meaning of
Jewishmonotheism from an enlightenment perspective has been seen as prefiguring the core principle of enlightened
universalism by referring to the idea of oneGod, wholly transcendent and cleared of any traces of anthropomorphism,
of whom no pictures should be made. This etherealization breaks with the concepts of animism and anthropomor-
phism of god and prepares the ground for enlightenment universalism qua abstraction, and thus constitutes the core
of “ethical monotheism” (Kepnes, 2013, Chapter 7). This account of Judaism developed in the discussions between
Kant and his Jewish contemporaries who tried to challenge Kant’s notion that Judaism, because of its supposed focus
on lawful obedience, could not be a “religion of reason” (Kant, 1977, pp. 789–792). It furthermore formed the theolog-
ical backbone of the Jewish Neo-Kantian tradition (Cohen, 1995) and also resonates through the works of Frankfurt
school critical theory where it informs Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s famous insistence on the prohibition of images,
lest immanence, the facticity of the “wrong whole,” be identified with transcendence (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2006,
p. 186). According to Žižek’s reading, this tradition finds is itsmost contemporary philosophical expressions in Levinas’
ethics of the “infinity” of the other and Derrida’s concept of messianic justice as the “indeconstructible,” thus identify-
ing the Jewish modernist-theological roots of postmodernism (Žižek, 2003, pp. 138–141; Žižek, 2006b, pp. 113–114)
and postulating a “Jewish” metaphysical tradition, encompassing Jewish enlightenment thought, the Frankfurt school
and deconstructive ethics (Žižek, 2016, p. 39).
Žižek hereby emphatically rejectswhat he regards as the core principle of this “Jewish” tradition inmetaphysics, by
attacking the prohibition of images as an undue transcendentalization, which actually, rather than avoiding substan-
tialist metaphysics, merely provides a more refined version of it. Thus, both Levinasian ethics and Derrida’s decon-
struction constitute:
the ultimate form of idolatry [which] is the deconstructive purifying of this Other, so that all that
remains of the Other is its place, the pure form of Otherness as the Messianic Promise. (Žižek, 2003,
p. 139)
Žižek essentially turns the basic premise of ethical monotheism on its head. What if the exact opposite of what it
alleges, were true?What if it would not be Christianity and its cult of Jesus whowasworshipping an idol and engaging
in substantialist metaphysics? What if the most absolute form imaginable of idol worship consists precisely in tran-
scendentalizing the idol?
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To put it even more directly: pagans were NOT celebrating images, they were well aware that the
images they were making remained inadequate copies of the true Divinity [. . . ]. In contrast to the
pagans, it was the Jews themselves who believed/assumed that the (sensual/material) image of the
divine Person would show too much, rendering visible some horrifying secret better left in shadow,
WHICH IS WHY THEY HAD TO PROHIBIT IT—the Jewish prohibition only makes sense against the
background of this fear that the image would reveal something shattering, that, in an unbearable way,
it would be TRUE and ADEQUATE. (Žižek, 2001a, p. 132)
What the image reveals, according to Žižek, is the fact that there is literally nothing behind it since its own incom-
pleteness is glaringly obvious,while it is precisely the prohibition of images that still manages to insinuate somehidden
truth. This is the core principle of Žižek’s reading of the Jewish tradition. It is not the Christians who are worshipping
an idol in Jesus, since his miserable death on the cross makes it perfectly clear that there is no metaphysical content
“behind” the empirical person, but it is Judaism whose transcendentalization of the idea of god masks the void at the
heart of the absolute more thorough than any idol ever could. An idol can fail, and what appears as divine can turn out
to be profane, fallible, and human. The idol whose depiction becomes prohibited, however, cannot be disproven and is
thereforemore idolatrous than any “actual” idol ever could be. Žižek relates this to his reading of Exodus 3,14:
What if the Jewish religion itself generates the excess it has to prohibit? It is the JEWISH God who is
the FIRST fully “personalized” God, a Godwho says “I amwho I am.” (Žižek, 2001a, p. 130)
In the original Hebrew, this passage reads: which—depending on the translation one consults—is
either translated as “I am that I am” (King James Bible and German unified translation), or as “I will be who I will be”
(Lutherbible). While in the tradition of “ethical monotheism,” this is taken to prefigure the abstract universalism of
enlightenment ethics, it is criticized by Žižek as ametaphysical postulate of substantialist self-identity.
Žižek continues his reading of the theological traditionwith the book of Job, where his ontology of the void enables
him to read Job as a story about the Camus-like absurdity of existence. All explanations for Jobs suffering are to Žižek
“ideology,” not because they are fallible, but because the assumption ofmeaning as such, of any transcendent quality, is
inherently fallacious. This allows him to discardwith the problem of theodicy altogether, without even really engaging
with it. Žižek thus concludes his reading by interpreting the book of Job as a declaration of Gods impotence:
What Job suddenly understood, was that it was not him, but God Himself, who was actually on trial in
Job’s calamities, and He failed the test miserably. (Žižek, 2003, p. 127)
Žižek’s makes this conception even more explicit in his reading of the passion of Christ, which he sees as being
prefigured in the myth of Job (Žižek, 2003, p. 124). Žižek takes Christs famous exclamation on the cross, “Oh father,
why hast thou forsaken me?,” quite literally. In the same way as Job does not find himself confronted by an almighty
but enigmatic deity, whose workings he cannot possibly understand and therefore finds himself without answers to
his suffering (while the premise that those answers indeed do exist still holds), so is the passion of Christ not a story
about the sublation of Christs suffering into a higher form of redemption, but itsmoral consists in the fact that god has
indeed forsaken Christ.
The son of god is left to die on the cross. God is actually dead. Yet again, this indicates, even more so than in the
myth of Job, what Žižek’s describes as a split in the absolute itself. Christ at the cross is god himself, bemoaning the
nonexistence of god. God has forsaken god and thus Nietzsche turns up as the “perverse core” of Christianity:
Since the function of the obscene superego supplement of the (divine) Law is to mask this impotence
of the big Other, and since Christianity reveals this impotence, it is, quite logically, the first (and only)
religion radically to leave behind the split between the official/public text and its obscene initiatory
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supplement: there is no hidden, untold story in it. In this precise sense, Christianity is the religion of
Revelation: everything is revealed in it, no obscene superego supplement accompanies its public mes-
sage.” (Žižek, 2003, p. 127)
The crucial point for Žižek in this regard is that his considerations must not be confused with any kind of negative
theology. Žižek’s intention is a form of radical immanentization of divine transcendence that is radically opposed the
gesture of transcendentalization that is constituted by referring to a “deus absconditus.” Žižek does not aim to shield
god from the ontico-empirical, but to draw him so brutally into this world as to kill him in the process.
4 FROM KIERKEGAARD TO POLITICAL ACTION: ŽIŽEK’S DECISIONISM
Based on these ontological and theological considerations, the crucial question seems to be: Where do we go from
here? What are the political implications of Žižek’s radical ontology of the void and his quasi-Nietzschean theology?
For Žižek, the keymediator to translate these ontological considerations into political conceptions is Kierkegaardwho
serves Žižek as amodel for political praxis. Furthermore, Žižek’s discussion of Kierkegaard also answers the question,
as to why Žižek still refers to a god or an absolute whose “death” he so empathically reiterates time and again:
Kierkegaard’s God is strictly correlative to the ontological openness of reality, to our relating to reality
as unfinished, “in becoming.” “God” is the name for the Absolute Other against which we can measure
the thorough contingency of reality—as such, it cannot be conceived as any kind of Substance, as the
Supreme Thing [. . . ]. [. . . ] God is “beyond the order of Being,” he is nothing but the mode of how we
relate to him; that is to say, we do not relate to him, he is this relating. (Žižek, 2006b, p. 79)
The key to the puzzle of gods identity in identity and nonidentity therefore lies in conceiving of the absolute in
terms of a pure relation. God exists in his nonexistence because he literally “is” the way in which we relate to him. This
ontological consideration prepares the ground for Žižek’s political interpretation of the Kierkegaardian “leap.” If god
is nothing other than the way in which we relate to him and if, furthermore, a conscious reflection of said relationship
needs to categorically cross out any transcendent qualities beyond the immediacy of relationality, then God himself
must coincide with our decision to enter into said relationship.
For Žižek, the Kierkegaardian “leap into belief” therefore becomes a sort of Fichtean fact-act (“Tathandlung”) that
both creates god and negates the symbolic universe in which political actions are embedded, through a categorical
“No” (Žižek, 2006b, pp. 80–81). But since god is devoid of any transcendent qualities beyond the immediacy of rela-
tionality, both the radical negation of the subject’s social environment as well as the affirmation of god collapse into
one single act: A radical gesture of noncompliance and rejection. A radical “No” towards everything, refusing any kind
of significationwhatsoever. This theoreticalmaneuver politicizes theKierkegaard’s “leap” into somethingmore similar
to an existentialist “decision.”
Here we enter a crucial zone of contradiction in Žižek’s political conceptions.While at times it seems as if his onto-
logical considerations, as outlined previously, prepare the ground for a sort of political decisionism, at other times he
seems to opt for a more radical conception. The concept of “Decision” in the tradition of Carl Schmitt describes the
transition from negating the social order to erecting a new one instead (Schmitt, 2015, p. 22). The Žižekian negation
constitutes a complete and utter rejection of any sense including the construction of a new social order, by a gesture
that cannot possibly be inscribed into the existing symbolic universe. Just as the Kierkegaardian subject leaps and
refuses to accept or expect any compensation for its utter sacrifice, the revolutionary act for Žižek is constituted by a
structurally similar categorical “No.” Žižek elaborates these ideas at the example of Paul Claudel’s play “The Hostage”
which ends with a seemingly pointless suicidal act of self-sacrifice of Sygne, the main character, to her arch-enemy
Turelure. Sygne, as she lies dying, stubbornly, and categorically refuses to signify her behavior in any way:
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Sygne did it for the sake of it, her act cannot be inscribed into any sacrificial economy, into any calculat-
ing strategy. In other words, this “No” is not a “No” to a particular content [. . . ] but a “No as such,” the
form-of-Nowhich is in itself the whole content, behind which there is nothing. (Žižek, 2006b, 83)
Žižek, however, is aware that the categorical nihilism implicit in this act remains constitutively related to the deci-
sionist erection of a new symbolic order:
Sygne’s gesture of separating herself from the Symbolic repeats the very form of the subject’s entry
into the Symbolic. It is crucial, however, not to confound this “No” with “No” as the zero-level symbolic
prohibition, as the purely formal “No” which grounds the symbolic order [. . . ]: Sygne’s “No” names a
more primordial negation, a feminine refusal/withdrawalwhich cannot be reduced to the paternal “No”
constitutive of the symbolic order. Even at the abstract level, the difference between the two is clear:
while the paternal “No” is purely formal, Sygne’s “No” is, on the contrary, a “No” embodied in a little
piece of the Real, the excremental remainder of a disgusting “pathological” tic that sticks out of the
symbolic form. The two “No”’s are thus like the same X on the two opposed sides of a Moebius strip: if
thepaternal “No” is thepure form, anemptyplacewithout content, Sygne’s “No” is anexcessiveelement
that lacks its “proper” place. (Žižek, 2006b, p. 83)
There are, so to speak two “No’s” we are dealing with. “No” as a form of radical nihilist abstention, and “No” as a
gesture of rejection towards the existing symbolic universe, that prepares the ground for the erection of a new one. A
categorical “No” towards everything and a specific “No” that precedes the decisionist political act.
Although Žižek attempts to differentiate the two kinds of “No” from one another, his analogy with the Moebius
strip makes it clear that the radical nihilism of the categorical “no” is (quite literally) only the flipside of the existential
decision and reintroduction of the new symbolic order that follows it: a Moebius strip is a three-dimensional surface
with only side, so that, by moving along the surface, one can connect any given point on the surface with any other
point. Thus, Žižek himself hints at the decisionism implicit in his conceptions.
This becomes even more explicit in his readings of Badiou. Here Žižek interprets the break with the existing sym-
bolic order as an existential decision, since “there is no Event outside the engaged subjective decision which creates
it,” until, a little further down the road:
the real hardwork awaits us on themorning after, once the enthusiastic revolutionary explosion is over,
andwe are confrontedwith the task of translating this explosion into a newOrder of Things, of drawing
the consequences from it, of remaining faithful to it. (Žižek, 2003, p. 135)
The negation here seems to bemuch closer to a decisionist one, than to the radical “non” vis-a-vis the symbolic uni-
verse: An existential “Decision” followed by the voluntarist introduction of a new order, by a subject that has aggran-
dized and legitimated itself to do so, by recourse to the relation to god it itself has established.
This radical political voluntarism has an inherent tilt towards authoritarian politics, since any possible normative
constraints to political praxis are effectively conceptually abolished in Žižek’s account. The political subject, who
established a direct relation to the absolute, can neither be normatively constrained by said absolute (since it is vir-
tually identical with it), nor by other political subjects (since they do not feature into aKierkegaardian account of polit-
ical subjectivity, that is modeled on the solipsistic relation of the individual believer to god).1 Radical negativity thus
collapses into its opposite: radical positivity, becoming identical with what is (the individual believer) instead of artic-
ulating a political horizon beyond the present political moment, thus sanctifying the present instead of transcending
it. The voluntarist existential “decision,” as Adorno put it in his criticism of Kierkegaard, becomes “decision” for what
exists anyway (Adorno, 2017, p. 47).
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The fact that Žižek explicitly refers to the communityof believers as inheriting the divine after the death ofChrist on
the cross (Žižek, 2003, p. 138) does not contradict the Kierkegaardian solipsism of his account of political subjectivity.
Thepolitical nature of this community is not basedon intersubjective processes of politicizationbut on amere addition
of fundamentally individuated acts of “fidelity to a Cause” (Žižek, 2003, p. 130). This “community” at best appears as a
community of confessingmonads.
The authoritarian dimension of Žižek’s political theology becomes explicit in his discussion of Kierkegaard in “Enjoy
your Symptom!.” If the transcendent absolute is conceived of in terms of the gap between the absolute and itself and
its core transcendent value therefore categorically rejected in favor of a radical immanentization, the same logic canbe
applied to political leadershipwhich is preciselywhat Žižek does by politicizingKierkegaardian theology in this regard.
Kierkegaard defines religious leadership in the case of the Apostles as purely based on the irrational faith in this
leadership itself, by alluding to the very symbolically unrepresentable gap between the person and its own noncoin-
cidence with itself that also marks the absolute. In other words: I follow the apostle not because I am convinced of
his doctrine, enchanted by his charisma, or lead to follow him by any immanent quality that’s directly attributable to
his person, but because of the naked fact that I believe that his words are the words of god. His authority is there-
fore entirely dependent on the noncoincidence of himself with himself, that is the transcendent quality of having been
called by god (Kierkegaard, 2009, p. 95). Just as inKierkegaard’s description of the binding of Isaac (Kierkegaard, 1983,
p. 35–36), following the Apostle out of conviction would thus be akin to an almost Habermasian act of rationalism
(“Paul has the better argument”) and as such per definition not belief but reason. Žižek now takes up Kierkegaard’s
model and transfers it to the political:
Such an assertion of authority seems to be the very opposite of the Enlightenment whose fundamental
aim is precisely to render truth independent of authority: truth is arrived at bymeans of the critical pro-
cedure which questions the pro et contra of a proposition irrespective of the authority that pertains to
its place of enunciation [. . . ]Marxism and psychoanalysis, both refer to the authority of their respective
founders (Marx, Freud). Their structure is inherently “authoritarian”: since Marx and Freud opened up
a new theoretical field which sets the very criteria of veracity, their words cannot be put to the test the
sameway one is allowed to question the statements of their followers. (Žižek, 1992, pp. 99–100)
Žižek thus turns Marx and Freud into latter day apostles, the measure of whose truth cannot and should not be
defined by reason (which would imply an undue transcendentalization of truth) but only by the standards the respec-
tive apostles set for themselves. This radical immanentization implies anepistemological “lawof the jungle”: ideasmust
become true when they are all-powerful and what is all-powerful must be true. Truth in this sense becomes indistin-
guishable from voluntarist terror. A concept that is apparently not alien to Žižek’s political theology, considering his
interpretation of Jacobinist terror as “divine violence” (Žižek, 2008, p. 162).
5 FROM THE ONTOLOGY OF “NOT YET” TO THE HUMANUM: IMMANENCE AND
TRANSCENDENCE IN BLOCH
In the following, I will contrast Žižek’s politico-theological concepts with the ones that Ernst Bloch developed, based
on his reading of largely identical philosophical and theological sources.
At a first glance, Ernst Bloch’s central philosophical project might appear like a contradiction in terms: amaterialist
metaphysics dedicated to bridging the gap between subject and object, spirit andmatter, human andworld, in a system
whose ultimate point of reference is utopia: the place where we are not (yet), in which the basic contradictions of
being will be reconciled and that speaks to us through a tendency articulated in all forms of human culture, finding
expression in art, architecture, religion, and philosophy. The vague and not necessarily conscious notion that there is
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somethingbeyondwhatexists in the “darknessof the livedmoment”—Bloch’s term for articulating theneed tomediate
the ostensible immediacy of the present moment (EBW 5, pp. 334–335)2—and that this “being beyond being” no less
“is” then the being of existence, provides the ontological thread for Bloch’s metaphysics.
This ontologyof “not-yet” relies onadialecticalmediationof subject andobject,matter, and spirit. Everything that is
tends to develop beyond itself out of its own constitutive contradictions. Existence might therefore precede essence,
but essence is always already present in existence as tendency. Essence can therefore not be artificially separated
from existence, but both are mediated through want. Everything in existence remains related to its essence as telos
through drive and longing (EBW15, p. 147). Bloch understands this ontology first and foremost as a form of material-
ism, albeit one that shirks the idea of matter as the dead and anorganic polar opposite to spirit. Bloch regards matter
and spirit as moments of a teleological process of self-realization (EBW 7, pp. 470–472). The “ExperimentumMundi,”
the experiment of the world, as Bloch terms it in his last opus magnum, is an experiment that matter conducts with
itself and in which humanity has a privileged part (EBW 15, pp. 263–264). The relation of existence to its “Not-Yet”
of essence at the same time defines the relevance transcendence has for Bloch’s metaphysics. When everything that
is remains constitutively related to what is not (yet), then all thought that relates to transcendence must ipso facto
have a certain truth value. Bloch reaffirms this epistemological consequence of his metaphysics by speaking about
the equal importance of what he calls the “cold stream” of a rational critique of ideology and the “warm stream” of
transcendent hope (EBW7, pp. 372–376). The aforementioned utopian expressions in art, architecture, daydreaming,
music, and philosophy contain such references to the “Not-Yet” of transcendence, but Bloch’smost important example
is religion and theology, since religious thought most comprehensively articulates “the fantastic realization of human
nature, inasmuch as human nature has no true reality” as Bloch puts it by quoting Marx (Bloch, 2009, p. 50; EBW 14,
p. 91).
While there is undoubtedly an extraordinarily voluminous panoply of thinkers that informs Ernst Bloch’s utopian
metaphysics, from the Greeks, to scholasticism, to existentialism, the theoretical backbone of his endeavor remains
firmly within the trajectory that Marx and Hegel pointed out. Bloch’s Marx however remains far closer to Hegel than
Soviet Orthodoxy would have him, and in his readings of Marx he mainly relies on his early works (Hudson, 1982,
pp. 65–66) much in accordance with the mushrooming of “Hegelianized” readings of Marxism that were induced by
the release ofMarx’ Paris manuscripts in the 1930s.
The central cue that Bloch takes from young Marx is his anthropology, which provides the centerpiece for Bloch’s
materialist metaphysics. In his early works, most notably the “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” the Paris
Manuscripts, “On the JewishQuestion” and the “Theses on Feuerbach,”Marx criticizedHegelian dialectics for its spir-
itual conception of mediation. While Hegel, according to Marx, was right to point out the inherently contradictory
and mediated character of social totality, mediation itself is conceived of in terms of self-movement of spirit, there-
fore precluding any active role of (wo)mankind in the process (Marx, 2009, p. 151). Putting Hegel on his feet, as Marx
famously put it, would thereforemean defining “labor” as the central concept in themediation of social contradictions.
It is by labor that (wo)man changes its environment, himself and others around it. Alienation thus designates a state of
being in which the products of (wo)mans own doing appear to it as an alien force. Communism in turn designates the
conscious reappropriation of the fact that (wo)mankind as a species creates its ownworld.
If matter and spirit, subject and object, immanence and transcendence appear as mediated moments of a process,
then what Bloch calls the “Humanum” constitutes the center of said mediation, the, as Bloch himself says, “archimedic
point” (EBW5, p. 333) of his endeavor. It is not by coincidence that Bloch’s magnumopus “The Principle of Hope” ends
with an emphatic reference to the “root of history,” namely, “the working, creating human being who reshapes and
overhauls the given facts” (Bloch, 1986, pp. 1375–1376; EBW5, p. 1628). Bloch explicitly situates this transcendental
humanismwithin aphilosophical tradition that reaches fromKant toMarx, connecting thematerialist,Marxist concept
of (wo)man as producer of its own essence, with the idealist, Kantian notion of human dignity, freedom, and humanity
as an end in itself (EBW 6, pp. 213–214). In this sense, Bloch connects the social-revolutionary tilt of Marxist human-
ism with Kantian ethics, referring to young Marx’ anthropology as a “material ‘categorical imperative’” (Bloch, 1986,
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p. 1358; EBW5, p. 1607) and explicitly invoking Kantian humanism in his rejection of Kierkegaards justification of the
binding of Isaac (EBW2, p. 181).
But yet, Bloch is neither Marx nor Kant and what is “not yet” cannot be resolved into categories of immanence,
anthropological, or otherwise. The residual transcendentalism that remains in Bloch’s metaphysics might not be able
to exist without its complementary immanent anthropology, but neither can the latter without the “warm stream” of
theological utopian hope. The fact that laboring mankind creates the world that it lives in, but does not do so con-
sciously but in a state of alienation, points at the intersection of immanence and transcendence: We could create a
world thatwould be home to us, if wewere aware thatwe could and yet, thisworld is still not here. It is, but it is not yet.
It exists, but only in dreams, imaginations, and theological concepts. To seek out the truth value of religious thought is
therefore key to Bloch’s understanding of utopia.
6 BLOCH’S EXEGESIS
In “Atheism in Christianity,” Bloch develops a form of exegesis and bible criticism that Louis Althusser would have
called a “symptomatic” reading (Althusser&Balibar, 1970, p. 28). Bloch’s “detectivework” in reading theBible consists
in identifying a subversive subterranean layer in the text thatwas subsequently redacted in the interest of legitimizing
clerical power (EBW 14, p. 101). Bloch thus reads the Bible as a sort of revolutionary palimpsest, whose radical criti-
cism of and struggle with godwas brushed over and transformed intomore digestible forms, but whose traces are still
very visible. At the core of this “underground bible” (EBW 14, p. 110), instead of worship and subservience, we find a
struggle with, wrestling with, and even revolt against god.
Part and parcel of the possibility of the holy text as a palimpsest is the fact of Gods noncoincidence with himself.
Bloch continually contraposes, what he sees as essentially paganist Baal- and Ptah-like influences on ancient Hebrew
monotheism, designating ademiurgical godof lordship and subserviencewith thegodof exodus, thegodof thepromise
of liberation (EBW14, pp. 59–61).
According to Bloch, therefore, the true revolution in mosaic monotheism and its conception of the god of exodus
consists first and foremost in the transcendentalization of god:
Instead of the finished goal there now appears a promised goal that must first be achieved; instead of
the visible nature god there appears an invisible god of righteousness and of the kingdom of righteous-
ness. (Bloch, 1986, pp. 1233–1234; EBW5, pp. 1454–1455)
From this transcendentalization of the idea of god follows a teleology of god. God becomes aim instead of presence.
This is emphasized in Bloch’s repeated reference to Exodus 3,14. Here, Bloch provides a reading that is diametrically
opposed to Žižek’s interpretation.
According to Bloch, the phrase: , which can be translated in both the future and the present tense,
hints at the intersection of present and future that is characteristic of Bloch’s conception of utopia: God both “is” and
“is not (yet).” Mosaic monotheism in this sense becomes exodus: Rebellion against a world that is not yet redeemed
(EBW5, p. 1453) andwhose ultimate battle cry is themosaic “Let my people go” (EBW5, p. 1456).
Bloch’s exegesis reaches its climax in his reading of Job. What Job represents, according to Bloch, is a belief in the
transcendent justice of god that is so strong, as to oppose god himself in its name. Bloch therefore identifies the expla-
nations of Jobs friends for his suffering, be it the reference to god’s divine knowledge, or the allegation of Jobs possible
wrongdoings, as biblical examples of ideology.Much unlike Žižek, however, who also designates these justifications as
ideology, Bloch asserts that the story of Job opens up the possibility of an immanent critique of divine justice: God
becomes transcendentalized to such a degree as to allow for the seemingly paradox act of a revolt against god in the
name of divine justice. This, in Bloch’s eyes, is the true core of the myth of Job: The story of a “Hebrew Prometheus”
(EBW5, pp. 1455–1456, 1500), which also serves as a perfect example of the dialectical mediation of immanence and
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transcendence in Bloch: God is beingmeasured against god itself and theworld as it is, against theworld as it might be
(but not yet is). Therefore, what in Žižek’s reading of Job, points towardsmere nothingness, leads in Bloch’s reading of
Job to the conclusion of a revolt against god in the name of god, with god’s own imperfection pointing at the promise
of liberation embodied by the god of exodus.
Bloch’s reading of the passion of Christ appears similar in this regard. Here, too, Bloch discards the justification of
earthly suffering—thepassionofChrist—as ideology. Blochgoes so far as to likenwhathe calls the “sacrificial theology”
of the passion of Christ to the cult ofMoloch and human sacrifice (EBW14, p. 222).
What specifically interests Bloch in Jesus, is his human-worldly immanence, which is why Bloch repeatedly insists
on thehistorical characterof Jesusas a real, empirical humanbeing. ForBloch, this solidly grounds thebelief inChrist in
worldly immanence and anchors it against mystifying transcendentalizations. “Ecce homo” is for Bloch the key phrase
in the passion of Christ (EBW5, pp. 1482–1486):
Thus, Christian faith more than any other lives from the historical reality of its founder, it is essentially
the imitation of a life on earth, not of a cult-image and its gnosis. This real memory acted over the cen-
turies: the imitation of Christ, however great the internalization and spiritualization, was primarily a
historical and only as such ametaphysical experience. (Bloch, 1986, p. 1259; EBW5, pp. 1486–1487)
This insistence on immanence refers back to young Marx: The subject of the revolt against an unredeemed world
is none other than (wo)man itself. In Bloch’s critique of the transcendent negative theology of Karl Barth, he therefore
takes an explicit stance against the conception of a “deus absconditus” (EBW 14, pp. 72–75). Bloch attacks Barth for
a negative theology that demeans (wo)man to mere abstract “humanity” and can only conceive of god in the form of a
heavenly “No.”
But still, the immanence of the Christ figure is always mediated through divine transcendence: Christ may be a
man, but far more than that at the same time. Bloch in this regard understands the transcendence of the god of Exo-
dus and the immanence of Christ—“the son of man” (EBW14, pp. 207–212), as Bloch repeatedly insists—as mediated
moments of the world process. Thus, also Barth’s negative theology is not being rejected completely, but rather quali-
fied by Bloch’s addition of theMarxist humanist element, which becomes clear in Bloch’s proposal to replace the “deus
absconditus” of negative theologywith a “homo absconditus,” therefore investigating the traces of theHumanum that
is not yet, within the theological tradition (EBW5, p. 1406).
This complex entanglement of transcendence and immanence is what Bloch refers to in the figure of “minimal dif-
ference”: The new world that utopia intends to build is in a certain sense “already here,” already immanent in the old
world and already present, since its point of departure is none other than the political actions of political subjects here
and now, and yet it constitutes a completely different, transcendent, redeemed world. Redemption is “already here”
because it does not require any sort of divine, transcendent, or metaphysical intervention. There is no “outside,” no
need for anything that would not already exist: (wo)man itself. Nevertheless, there is a gap.We are still unsaved, there
still remains a (minimal) transcendent residue:
Another rabbi, a true Kabbalist, once said: To bring about the kingdom of freedom, it is not necessary
that everything be destroyed, and a newworld begin; rather, this cup, or that bush, or that stone, and so
all thingsmust only be shifted a little. Because this “a little” is hard to do, and itsmeasure so hard to find
humanity cannot do it in this world; instead this is why the Messiah comes. (Bloch, 2006, p. 158; EBW
1, pp. 201–202)
The crucial role of the aforementioned element of Marxist humanism lies in the possibility it provides Bloch with
to bridge the gap between immanence and transcendence, which in political terms highlights the relevance of strate-
gic political actions: It takes collective action within social structures that are not yet liberated to bring about future
liberation.
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While Žižek, in a similar manner than Bloch, locates ideology in the sacrificial logic of rationalizing Jobs and Christs
suffering by reference to divine knowledge, his “Christian-Schellingian” approach of equating divinity with noth-
ingness and collapsing it into unmediated immanence, appears strikingly undialectical in that it makes it impossible
for him to engage in an immanent critique of divine justice in the way Bloch does. Because for Žižek “I am who I
am” refers to simple self-identity, Jobs suffering is simply meaningless and god did actually die on the cross, any
avenues for thinking beyond the immediacy of the “darkness of the lived moment” are effectively closed and the only
truly political act that remains is the radical negation of everything. The ontological root of this political problem
lies precisely in the difference between Žižek’s “Nothing” and Bloch’s “minimal difference” between transcendence
and immanence.
7 THE ABSOLUTE AS TELOS: KIERKEGAARD, SCHELLING, AND THE PRIORITY OF
BEING
Similar to Žižek, also Bloch is specifically interested in post-Hegelian philosophy because of its criticism of Hegelian
rational systematicity, which is why he specifically focuses on those thinkers that he identifies as “Anti-Panlogists”3
One of the key conceptual points of departure for Bloch is the factuality of being as existence (EBW 8, p. 387) as a
counterpoint to panlogic systematicity, a concern he shares with the existentialist tradition and which provides the
conceptual background for his readingof theirworks, specifically in the caseof SørenKierkegaard. In “Spirit ofUtopia,”
Bloch enthusiastically praises Kierkegaard as the “Hume of our times,” that has, similarly to the latter, “awakened us
from our dogmatic slumber” (EBW 3, p. 249) and whose existentialism serves as a corrective against Hegelian panl-
ogism. For both Bloch and Kierkegaard “Existenz” as the factuality of being, or “Dass” (“That”), as Bloch puts it, must
serve as the point of departure of any serious ontology, a fact that Hegelian panlogism in its ceaseless endeavor to
make everything identical to reason and its abstractions does not sufficiently take into account:
Only that cognition, Kierkegaard teaches, which relates essentially to our existence, is essential cog-
nition, existential pathos, in contrast to which all alienated, dispassionately systematic procedure rep-
resents nothing but a cheap, mendacious way to process oneself out of the immediacy from which the
truth regards us utterly [. . . ]. (Bloch, 2000, p. 198; EBW3, p. 250)
However, “Dass” needs to be complemented by “Was” (“What”), quodditas by quidditas, existence by essence and
therefore both need to be understood as mediated moments of the whole (EBW 15, p. 178). It is from this vantage
point,whereBlochattacksKierkegaard.WhileBloch recognizes theneed toguard concrete existence frombeing swal-
lowed up by the panlogism of Hegelian systematicity, he regards Kierkegaard’s conception of existence as a solipsistic
illusion, whichmight be able repress the consciousness of its ownmediation through social totality but not abolish the
fact of social mediation itself:
The Self, however, which Kierkegaard remembers against the general and the constructed abstract, is
no less abstract itself. For it elopes to a home as unhomely as ever, it closes itself off from and raises
itself above social relationships. Without ceasing to be part of them: Inwardness as well as privacy are
social relationships, too. (EBW8, p. 394 [translation by the author])
Parallel to his approach to Kierkegaard, also Schelling is being read by Bloch as a thinker of “existence”:
The fact that something is, as the late Schelling teaches, this discrete and actual Dasein is not deducible
from thinking and reason. (EBW8, p. 396 [translation by the author]).
PAUKSTAT 363
But rather than identifying existence with human existence in the way Kierkegaard does, Schelling tries to accom-
modate it within the confines of a philosophy that still adheres to rational systematicity and that therefore differ-
entiates within the system, as Bloch puts it “between the rational and the real, the logical factor and the subjectivist
intensive” (EBW 8, p. 398 [translation by the author]). To Bloch, Schelling therefore becomes a “gnostic of the world
process between primal urge and logos” (EBW10, p. 102 [translation by the author]).
As opposed to Bloch’s relation to Kierkegaard, there is already a significant amount of literature on the relation-
ship between Bloch and Schelling. However, much of the existing literature puts an undue amount of emphasis on
the indebtedness of Bloch to Schelling, with Jürgen Habermas famously going so far as to declare Bloch a “Marx-
ist Schelling” (Habermas, 1960).4 And while it is true that Bloch famously spoke about Schelling as his philosophical
“brother” (Bloch, 1985, p. 204), and that there are glaring similarities between Bloch’s anthropocentric materialism
and Schelling’s equally anthropocentric philosophy of nature,5 what is conspicuously overlooked in many of these
accounts is the degree to which Bloch engages in a quite radical critique of Schelling specifically regarding his con-
ception of the “Ungrund.”
While Bloch recognizes and values the fact that Schelling introduces an element of nonidentity into German ideal-
ismwhose relevance consists in the fact that through nonidentity the apologetic character ofHegelian systematic phi-
losophy (which politically tends to sanctify the existing social order by identifying itwith reason) becomes undermined
(EBW 8, pp. 397–398), Bloch radically opposes what he sees as Schelling’s effort the ontologize nonidentity in terms
of a quasi-manichean ontology, by assuming an irrational a priori as opposed to logos. It is of utmost importance in this
regard to read Bloch’s critique of late-Schellingian philosophy closely: While he refers positively to the Schellingian
conception of an “Ungrund” prior to Logos per se, he criticizes the specific conception this takes on in Schelling, which
he regards as a prioritization and unmediated reification of nonbeing (EBW13, pp. 261–262). This also whereWayne
Hudson has it wrong, when he declares that
Existing reality iswill-like (dasshaft) because it rests on a groundwhich is not a ground. This non-ground
cannot be characterised as something with being. Rather, for Bloch, as for Schelling, the non-ground
with which everything begins is before being. (Hudson, 1982, p. 121)
ToBloch “Being” remains theprioritized category. In this sense the “Ungrund” is not “beforebeing,”which insinuates
exactly the kind of abstract contradiction of being and nonbeing and the prioritization of nonbeing that Bloch criticizes
in Schelling and seeks to avoid. As we have seen, this line of argument is of particular importance since it precisely
marks the point where Bloch parts ways with Žižek in his reading of Schelling. Nonbeing is, according to Bloch, not
abstractly opposed to Being but only conceivable in relation to it and ultimately even subordinate to it:
always nothing remains, although and because it stands opposed to being, a type of, a counter-type
of being, namely non-being. Being is also in relation to non-being the overarching term; what stands
opposed to nothing, is not being in general, but positive being, What-determinacy as fullness of being,
rather than depletion of being [. . . ] The ontology of nothing does not need its own non-ground, from
which the black card of death emerges out of nowhere; this ismythological dualism. The lattermight be
better than the so-called wholesale drunkenness with being, which has lost the part of nothing almost
completely from its concept of the world, according to which in all the pan-logic worldviews, there is
not only no place for evil, but also none for time, not to speak of utopia; because everything then has
to be depicted as if complete. Nevertheless, darkness is not a genuine principle of the world, dualisti-
cally alongside the origin, inmanichean, Schellingian fashion. (EBW13, pp. 252–253 [translation by the
author])
While Ernst Bloch’s reading of Schelling and Kierkegaard positively acknowledges their function as an existen-
tialist corrective to Hegelian panlogism, while still criticizing Kierkegaard’s solipsism and Schelling’s “manichean”
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ontologyof nonbeing, Slavoj Žižek, aswehave seen, provides a different approach. In a far less ambiguousmanner than
Bloch, he identifies Schelling and—even more so—Kierkegaard as those “vanishing mediators” that can help identify
the truly Lacanian character of Hegelian dialectics. Thus, the very primacy of nonbeing that Bloch attacks in Schelling
is received enthusiastically by Žižek. While for Bloch the groundless ground of ontology must be understood as “ten-
dency” and incompleteness, which is why he criticizes Schelling for his manichean prioritization of nonbeing, for Žižek
the “Ungrund” is a constitutive void. At the center of ontology, we do not find a “nihil privativum” as in Bloch, but rad-
ical abstract nonbeing, negativity as such. Thus, for Bloch, the split in God itself is between existence and essence and
thereforemanifests itself in a tendency towards a telos, based on a constitutive lack. For Žižek, the split equally refers
to existence andessence, but conceives of essence as amere form, radically devoid of any substance and as such identi-
cal with its own lack. Therefore, based on this constitutive void, there is neither “tendency” nor “telos.” In otherwords:
What is a lack to be fulfilled for Bloch, is a bottomless void for Žižek. One that he subsequently attempts to fill with
an existentialist voluntarism whose decisionism, unbound by any transcendental constraints, devolves into irrational
authoritarianism.
8 CONCLUSION
The conception of a split in God itself as the “Ungrund” of everything that is in the late works of Friedrich Schelling,
marks the nodal point that condenses the essence of German idealism, the beginnings of existential philosophy and
the political theology intertwinedwith both.
The idea that what is not god is already part of god, or—in secularized terms—that logos remains constitutively
intertwined with its other, provides the background against which Bloch and Žižek conceptualize their respective
political theologies, their readings of the Judeo-Christian tradition and their attempts to answer the core question
of utopian politics: How can we conceive of, conceptualize or at least deal with the fact that our politics remains inex-
tricably bound upwith transcendence and that our political existence is antithetically connected to what is not (yet).
Any serious engagement with this issue needs to begin by asking what exactly we mean, when we say “not.” To
what does the split in the absolute refer? What exactly is the “Ungrund,” the “indivisible remainder” that Schelling
speaks about? To Žižek it is a void of pure nothingness. Hence, he complements and politicizes Schellingian ontology
by recourse to Kierkegaard. However, once the Kierkegaardian “leap” becomes a political concept, it almost inevitably
paves the way for an irrational kind of decisionism.
What Žižek dissolves into a pure immanence that aggrandizes the political subject thus enabling his solipsist deci-
sionism, appears in Bloch as a complex dialectical mediation of immanence and transcendence. Thus, for Bloch, the
Schellingian "Ungrund” refers to an as of yet unredeemedworld, the fact thatmatter has not yet fulfilled the tendency
towards which it strives. Like in the famous kabbalist theologumenon that Bloch refers to, things are not in their right
place, there is indeed a lack in everything that exists. But it is a lack, not a void. The fact that it is up to us to bring
this world about and fill this lack, is what for Bloch refers Schelling to young Marx in what Bloch called the “line of
salvation.”
Žižek, as we have seen, takes a different direction. Because his conception of the Schellingian Ungrund prioritizes
nonbeing, his Schelling does not refer toMarx, but, along the “line of perdition,” to a politicizedKierkegaard. Not to the
“Humanum” realizing itself, but to nothingness and the “decision” that it begets.
Žižek’s voluntarism that follows from his Kierkegaardian conception of political subjectivity naturally leads to
authoritarian tendencies, because his model of political subjectivity at its very root ignores the intersubjectivity of
the political. Thus, when Žižek argues that his immanentization of transcendence “delivers us from guilt” (Žižek, 2007,
p. 98), this has to be taken literally. Žižek’s political subject is absolved from responsibility for its actions, since it itself
becomes virtually identical with the very place from which ethical injunctions might be made. Its I not by coincidence
that Žižek’s endorsement of Jacobinist terror as “divine violence,” explicitly refers to terror as a “a decision [. . . ] made
in absolute solitude, with no cover from the big Other” (Žižek, 2008, pp. 163).
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Contrary to this, Blochian ontology retains the contradiction between immanence and transcendence. Beyond
purely ontological and epistemological considerations, this entails both ethical and strategic-political consequences
that Žižek’s concept lacks.
While ethical injunctions are irrelevant to a Kierkegaardian political subject that has short-circuited the relation
between political subjectivity and ethics and solipsistically absolved himself of responsibility for the “terror” it pro-
poses, to Bloch, the key concept of the Humanum both opens up a utopian horizon of potentiality in the Marxist-
materialist sense, while at the same time reminding us that this potentiality remains anchored in Kantian ethics. Any-
thing is possible for the collective of humanity, but by virtue of being a collective (rather than an agglomeration of
individualized believers), this potentiality remains tied to itself, because its point of departure is at the same time its
point of reference: The fact that (wo)man shall be the highest being for (wo)man (Marx, 1976, p. 385) or in Kantian
terms, that humanity can never be ameremeans to an end (Kant, 1968b, p. 429).
Retaining the contradiction between transcendence and immanence also has strategic-political consequences. The
constraints of immanent, real-world political relations, the contradiction that we strive for emancipation but have to
do so in an as of yet unredeemedworld, is reflected in Blochsmodel by looking for tendencies that exist in the present
but point beyond the present order of political power. Blochsmodel builds bridges from theworld as it is, to the world
as it might be and therefore opens up the possibility for strategic political initiative. Žižek’s strikingly undialectical
answer to the same problem is to merely propose gestures of radical negation towards everything, whose flipside—as
he readily admits—is an essentially arbitrary “decision” for the sake of decision.
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NOTES
1 In this context, Andrew Robinson and Simon Tormey have referred to the fact that Žižek’s examples for politically transfor-
mative actions are almost exclusively framed as “isolated acts by individuals [. . . ]. Even the Russian Revolution becomes for
Žižek a set of individual choices by Lenin, Stalin and the aforementioned bureaucrats” (Robinson & Tormey, 2005, p. 102).
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the collected works of Bloch refer to Bloch (1985b) and are quoted as: EBW
1–16. Wherever direct quotes appear, existing English translations are used as far as available and indicated alongside the
references to the GermanWerkausgabe, where they are not available, direct quotes are translated by the author and also
indicated accordingly.
3 (EBW8, p. 390).Onewould have to add, thatwhile Bloch explicitly treats Schelling andKierkegaard as critics ofHegel, Žižek
attempts to reintegrate them all into Hegel via Lacan (Žižek, 2007, p. 6).
4 Similarly: Hudson, 1982, pp. 72–73, 120–121. A more nuanced account (specifically regarding Blochs reading of the “Frei-
heitsschrift”) can be found in Wüstehube (1989, pp. 261–262). In this regard, see also Mayer (2014, Chapter 2). On the
relation between Hegel and Schelling in Blochs thought, see Zeilinger (2006, pp. 52–54). There is close to no literature on
the relation of Bloch to Kierkegaard. The only two exemptions being Vaisfeld (2016) and Fahrenbach (1980).
5 Bloch explicitly discusses Schelling’s philosophy of nature from amaterialist perspective in EBW7 (pp. 228–229).
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